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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Thomas L. Kivisto, co-founder and former President 
and CEO of SemCrude L.P., an Oklahoma-based oil and gas 
company, allegedly drove SemCrude into bankruptcy through 
his self-dealing and speculative trading strategies.  
SemCrude’s Litigation Trust sued Kivisto, and the parties 
reached a settlement agreement and granted a mutual release 
of all claims.  One month later, a group of SemCrude’s 
former limited partners (collectively, “Oklahoma Plaintiffs”) 
sued Kivisto in state court, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, 
negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.  Kivisto filed an 
emergency motion to enjoin the state action on the theory that 
the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims derived from the Litigation 
Trust’s claims, which the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware granted.  On appeal, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Delaware reversed, concluding that 
the claims were possibly direct and remanded.  The 
Bankruptcy Court thereafter adopted the District Court’s 
order in its entirety and denied injunctive relief.  Because we 
conclude that the claims are derivative, we will reverse. 
I. 
A. 
Kivisto co-founded SemCrude in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 
2000 and served as its President and CEO until 2008.  
SemCrude provided transportation, storage, distribution, and 
other oil-and-gas services to crude oil producers and refiners 
across North America’s energy corridor.  By 2006, SemCrude 
became one of the largest privately-held companies in the 
United States, with assets worth almost $14 billion.  
In 2007 and 2008, however, SemCrude was driven into 
bankruptcy, the cause of which is disputed by the parties.  
Kivisto blames the company’s collapse on, among other 
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market factors, rising oil prices and tight credit markets that 
were inhospitable to Kivisto’s previously successful trading 
strategy.  The Oklahoma Plaintiffs, on the other hand, blame 
Kivisto for “engag[ing] in a pattern of egregious self-dealing 
and related-party transactions, commingl[ing] personal and 
corporate funds, and ma[king] wildly speculative trades for 
his own benefit” that allegedly caused SemCrude billions of 
dollars in losses.  Appellees’ Br. at 2 n.1.  In particular, they 
allege that Kivisto used SemCrude’s funds to place bets on oil 
for his personal benefit through a trading company that he 
owned with his wife, Westback Purchasing Company, LLC 
(“Westback”), causing SemCrude to incur a $290 million 
receivable; and engaged in high-risk, double-or-nothing 
trades on behalf of SemCrude, stripping SemCrude of its 
ability to finance its operations and causing over $3 billion in 
losses.  App. 333-43.   
The Oklahoma Plaintiffs further allege that Kivisto 
concealed these decisions and actively misrepresented 
SemCrude’s financial health and stability in order to induce 
them to invest additional capital or retain their investments in 
SemCrude.  They specifically assert that Kivisto, among other 
things, misrepresented that SemCrude’s “trading positions 
were always ‘delta neutral’” and that it “‘closed its positions 
in its trading books every day,’” and concealed the existence 
of his personal trading scheme as well as SemCrude’s trade 
exposure and attendant risks.  App. 338.  The Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs claim that “Kivisto made these misrepresentations 
to [the Oklahoma] Plaintiffs during shareholders’ meetings, 
‘informative unitholder meetings,’ and other meetings—both 
formal and informal” in 2000; 2001; April and September 
2002; July 2003; December 2004; and later.  App. 338.  In 
“reli[ance] upon Kivisto’s representations,” the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs allege that they “contributed millions of dollars to 
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Sem[Crude] through capital contributions made [i]n” 
December 2000; November 2002; December 2003; January 
2005; and May 2006.  App. 338.   
They also allege that “Kivisto was particularly 
aggressive in his efforts to induce [the Oklahoma] Plaintiffs 
to make their 2006 capital contributions.”  App. 338.  On or 
about May 25, 2006, during a lunch meeting at Southern Hills 
Country Club in Tulsa that occurred one day before a capital 
contribution deadline, “Kivisto approached certain of the 
[Oklahoma] Plaintiffs and made several statements clearly 
intended to induce them to make these capital contributions.”  
App. 338.  He allegedly told some of the Oklahoma Plaintiffs 
that “you’ve got 24 hours to get your money in,” and “you 
don’t want to miss this one,” emphasizing that the value of 
their shares would increase substantially in the future and that 
failing to make the contributions would cause them financial 
loss.  App. 338-39 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Those 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs contributed several million dollars to 
SemCrude shortly thereafter.   
In essence, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs claim that, as a 
result of their personal dealings with Kivisto, they “acted 
and/or forewent certain actions in reliance upon Kivisto’s 
misrepresentations and omissions. . . . [This is] illustrated, in 
part, by the millions of dollars [the Oklahoma] Plaintiffs paid 
to Sem[Crude] in the form of capital contributions.”  App.  
350.  They distinguish themselves from other limited partners 
because they allege that Kivisto’s misrepresentations were 
made specifically to them.  They also distinguish themselves 
as “non-insider” limited partners, claiming that all other 
limited partners held board or management positions or were 
involved in “sweetheart side deals” with Kivisto, which 
allowed these “insiders” to obtain information not available to 
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the Oklahoma Plaintiffs or dissuaded them from disclosing 
Kivisto’s alleged misconduct.  Appellees’ Br. at 2. 
B. 
On July 22, 2008, SemCrude, its parent company, 
SemGroup L.P., and certain direct and indirect subsidiaries 
(collectively, “SemCrude”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  The 
Bankruptcy Court entered a confirmation order on October 
28, 2009, confirming SemCrude’s plan of reorganization.  
The reorganization plan established a Litigation Trust and 
transferred to it the claims belonging to SemCrude’s 
bankruptcy estate.  The Litigation Trust was therefore entitled 
to pursue SemCrude’s claims and distribute the money it 
recovered to SemCrude’s creditors. 
In 2009, the Litigation Trust1 asserted against Kivisto, 
certain former SemCrude officers, and Westback thirty claims 
related to breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, 
fraudulent transfer, and unjust enrichment.  See App. 61-150.  
Following mediation, the parties reached a $30 million 
settlement agreement (that was paid out of the directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance policies) and granted a mutual 
release of all claims.  The Litigation Trust also discharged 
Kivisto and the other SemCrude officers from liability to any 
party for contribution or indemnity relating to the released 
claims.  The Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement 
agreement on November 19, 2010.  
                                              
1 More precisely, the Litigation Trust was substituted 
as the plaintiff in an adversary proceeding brought by an 
unofficial committee of SemCrude’s unsecured creditors. 
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One month later, on December 22, 2010, the 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs2 filed suit against Kivisto and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (“PwC”), SemCrude’s pre-
bankruptcy auditor, in the Tulsa County District Court in 
Oklahoma.  Asserting injuries allegedly separate and distinct 
from the injuries sustained by SemCrude, the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs sought money damages from Kivisto for breach of 
fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud, and 
from PwC for professional negligence and a violation of the 
Oklahoma Accountancy Act.  See App. 325-53.  PwC 
removed the case, but the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma remanded the case back to state court.  
Ultimately, although PwC is not a party to this appeal, the 
Bankruptcy Court enjoined the action against PwC as 
derivative on October 7, 2011,3  and the District Court 
affirmed that order on November 15, 2012.   
On May 4, 2011, Kivisto filed an emergency motion in 
the Bankruptcy Court to enjoin the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ 
lawsuit from proceeding in state court and, specifically, to 
enforce the confirmation order, the terms of the 
reorganization plan, and the settlement agreement.  He 
alleged that the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims belonged to the 
Litigation Trust and had been released.  SemCrude and the 
Litigation Trust joined the motion.   
                                              
2 The Oklahoma Plaintiffs include Cottonwood 
Partnership, L.L.P; Dunbar Family Partnership, L.P.; Rosene 
Family L.L.C.; Warren F. Kruger; Katherine A. Kruger; 
David S. Kruger; and Kathryn E. Shelley. 
3 Prior to the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ suit, the Litigation 
Trust sued PwC in the Tulsa County District Court for 
professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and a 
violation of the Oklahoma Accountancy Act. 
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The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion to enjoin all 
three claims on October 7, 2011.  It explained that the 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims were derivative causes of action 
for the following reasons: (1) “[T]he injury suffered by the 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs is no different from the injury suffered 
by SemCrude as a result of Kivisto’s wrongful conduct”; (2) 
the Oklahoma Plaintiffs did not show that Kivisto owed them 
any duties distinct from his fiduciary duties owed to 
SemCrude and its other equity holders; and (3) any recovery 
would be deemed equity in SemCrude’s estate and, therefore, 
the Oklahoma Plaintiffs would not be entitled to recovery 
outside the terms of the reorganization plan.  App. 19.  The 
parties agreed to stay the lawsuit in state court pending final 
resolution of these proceedings.  
The Oklahoma Plaintiffs appealed to the District 
Court, and, on November 15, 2012, the District Court 
reversed and remanded the Bankruptcy Court’s order on all 
three claims.  The District Court explained that the 
Bankruptcy Court did not properly consider the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs’ claims that they had been separately harmed and 
found that there was a sufficient basis to conclude that they 
had been.  As to negligent misrepresentation and fraud, it 
pointed to Kivisto’s misrepresentations to the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs “personally to induce them to make capital 
contributions.”  App. 36.  As to breach of fiduciary duty, it 
pointed to “the length and nature” of Kivisto’s relationship 
with the Oklahoma Plaintiffs and the “trust and confidence 
reasonably placed by [the Oklahoma] Plaintiffs in the 
integrity and loyalty of Kivisto.”  App. 37 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Therefore, since the Oklahoma Plaintiffs 
sufficiently alleged distinct duties, they “may be able to 
demonstrate entitlement to a recovery separate from 
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Sem[Crude].”  App. 37.  The District Court thereafter denied 
Kivisto’s motion for rehearing on March 12, 2013.  
On remand, the Bankruptcy Court denied Kivisto’s 
motion to enjoin the negligent misrepresentation and fraud 
claims, but granted the motion with respect to the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim.  This order was entered on July 2, 2013, 
and both Kivisto and the Oklahoma Plaintiffs appealed.  On 
October 30, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court amended its order 
and “adopt[ed] and incorporate[d] by reference herein the 
legal analysis, findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 
District Court’s November 15, 2012 [] [o]rder, in its entirety.”  
App. 6.  It therefore denied Kivisto’s motion to enjoin with 
respect to all three claims.  Kivisto timely appealed from the 
amended order. 
II. 
Because Kivisto’s motion to enjoin is related to the 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan and requires a determination 
that the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims are property of the 
Litigation Trust, the Bankruptcy Court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A).  This 
Court exercises jurisdiction over Kivisto’s direct appeal 
pursuant to certification by the Bankruptcy Court, the District 
Court, and the parties acting jointly under 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d)(2).4  
                                              
4 The Bankruptcy Court certified Kivisto’s request for 
direct appeal to the Third Circuit in its October 30, 2013, 
amended order; the parties jointly certified the appeal on 
November 22, 2013; and the District Court certified the 
parties’ joint request on March 11, 2014, and Kivisto’s 
request on March 31, 2014.  This Court authorized the appeal 
on January 21, 2014. 
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This Court “review[s] the Bankruptcy Court’s factual 
findings under a clearly erroneous standard and exercise[s] 
plenary review over legal issues.”  In re Emoral, Inc., 740 
F.3d 875, 879 (3d Cir. 2014).   Whether a claim is derivative 
or direct is a question of (state) law, see Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F.3d 
340, 348 (3d Cir. 2001), so we exercise plenary review.  
While we review a court’s denial of injunctive relief for abuse 
of discretion, plenary review of the issue of derivative status 
is appropriate here because “[a] district court by definition 
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”  Koon v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).   
III. 
“The derivative injury rule holds that a shareholder . . . 
may not sue for personal injuries that result directly from 
injuries to the corporation.”  In re Kaplan, 143 F.3d 807, 811-
12 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying Illinois law).  The rule is 
premised on the legal fiction of corporate existence, in which 
“an injury to the corporate body is legally distinct from an 
injury to another person.”  Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors, 267 F.3d at 348.  Under Oklahoma law, which the 
parties concede controls here, the derivative injury rule does 
not apply when a shareholder alleges that he or she “sustained 
any loss in addition to the loss sustained by the corporation.”  
Dobry v. Yukon Elec. Co., 290 P.2d 135, 138 (Okla. 1955) 
(emphasis added).  This standard extends to limited 
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partnerships.5  Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 54, § 500-1001A(b) (“A 
partner commencing a direct action under this section is 
required to plead and prove an actual or threatened injury that 
is not solely the result of an injury suffered or threatened to 
be suffered by the limited partnership.”).   
 We discuss the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims for (A) 
negligent misrepresentation and fraud6 and (B) breach of 
fiduciary duty in turn.  The Court ultimately concludes that 
the Oklahoma Plaintiffs fail to show “any loss in addition to” 
SemCrude’s loss and, therefore, that their claims derive from 
the claims released by the Litigation Trust.  
 
 
 
                                              
5 Under Oklahoma law, we may rely upon corporate as 
well as partnership case law in analyzing the derivative/direct 
nature of the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims because the 
determination is substantially the same in the corporate and 
limited partnership contexts.  See Lenz v. Associated Inns & 
Rests. Co. of Am., 833 F. Supp. 362, 379 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (applying Oklahoma law); see also Adco Oil Co. v. 
Rovell, 357 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2004) (construing 
Oklahoma law and applying the derivative injury rule in a 
limited partnership context).  
 
6 The District Court and the parties treat negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud together in light of their doctrinal 
similarity under Oklahoma law.  See App. 36 (citing 
Roberson v. PaineWebber, Inc., 998 P.2d 193, 197 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 1999) (stating the elements for fraud); Ragland v. 
Shattuck Nat’l Bank, 36 F.3d 983, 991 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(stating the elements for negligent misrepresentation)).  
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A. 
1. 
Before analyzing whether the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ 
claims state derivative or direct causes of action, we lay out 
the analytical framework established by the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma in Dobry v. Yukon Electric Company, 290 P.2d at 
138.  The parties agree that Dobry creates the governing 
standard for determining the derivative status of claims in 
Oklahoma. 
The Dobry Court considered whether the plaintiff-
stockholder could bring a direct claim against the directors of 
a corporation whose fraudulent conduct resulted in loss “by 
depriving [the shareholder] of dividends which he might 
otherwise have received or by depressing the value of his 
stock.”  Id. at 137.  Adopting the universal principles 
underlying the derivative injury rule, the Court explained that 
there is no individual loss in such a situation: 
In view of the legal concept of corporate entity 
under which stockholders as such lose their 
individualities in the individuality of the 
corporation as a separate and distinct person, 
and of the fact that stockholders by investing 
their money in the corporation recognize it as 
the person primarily entitled to control and 
manage its use for the common benefit of all the 
stockholders, it is a well-established general 
rule that a stockholder of a corporation has no 
personal or individual right of action against 
third persons, including officers and directors of 
the corporation, for a wrong or injury to the 
corporation which results in the destruction or 
depreciation of the value of his stock, since the 
wrong thus suffered by the stockholder is 
 13 
merely incidental to the wrong suffered by the 
corporation and affects all stockholders alike. 
 
Id. (quoting H.A. Wood, Stockholder’s Right to Maintain 
(Personal) Action Against Third Person as Affected by 
Corporation’s Right of Action for the Same Wrong, 167 
A.L.R. 280 (1947)) (emphasis added).  In other words, the 
Court underscored, where the alleged loss stems from 
management’s wrong to the corporation that incidentally 
affects the shareholder’s stock and affects all shareholders 
alike, the rights are derivative.   This is because “‘[i]t was not 
as individuals that plaintiffs suffered detriment and damage, 
but as stockholders in common with others similarly situated.  
No fraud or deceit was practiced on plaintiffs, nor was any 
illegal act performed to their detriment, which was not 
common to all persons similarly situated in their legal 
relations to defendants.’”  Id. at 138 (quoting Stuart v. 
Robertson, 248 P. 617, 619 (Okla. 1926)). 
The Court reiterated the following rule:  “‘If the 
plaintiff has sustained no loss in addition to the loss to the 
corporation, the action cannot be maintained as an individual 
even though the wrongful acts were done with the specific 
intent of injuring the plaintiff.’”  Id. at 137 (quoting 12B 
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5914).  It concluded that “[i]n the 
instant case the plaintiff did not allege . . . that he sustained 
any loss in addition to the loss sustained by the corporation.  
His loss was only incidental to the corporation’s loss and 
under the rules set forth herein, his rights were derivative.”  
Id. at 138.   
With this backdrop, we turn to whether the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs allege direct claims—that is, whether they allege 
loss “in addition to” SemCrude’s loss.     
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2. 
Because whether a suit is derivative or direct is drawn 
from the face of the complaint, see 12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 
5913, our analysis is drawn from the state-court petition filed 
by the Oklahoma Plaintiffs against Kivisto. 
The Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ first claim for distinct loss is 
based on Kivisto’s alleged face-to-face misrepresentations 
and omissions directed at the Oklahoma Plaintiffs during 
formal and informal limited partner meetings, in particular the 
2006 lunch meeting at the Southern Hills Country Club, and 
based on their alleged status as “non-insider” limited partners.  
They allege that they relied on Kivisto’s inducement by 
(a) making additional capital contributions and (b) foregoing 
opportunities to sell their limited partner units.   
Kivisto counters that the Oklahoma Plaintiffs are 
functionally indistinguishable from any other investor who 
acted upon or forewent opportunities to sell their limited 
partner units as a result of Kivisto’s misrepresentations and 
omissions.  He argues that all SemCrude limited partners 
suffered the same loss of capital on a pro rata basis as a result 
of his alleged misconduct and, therefore, the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs’ “[r]espective losses differ only in amount, not in 
kind,” making their claims derivative.  Appellant’s Br. at 30.   
We agree.  “It is well settled that an injury done to the 
stock and capital of a corporation by the negligence or 
misfeasance of its officers and directors is an injury done to 
the whole body of stockholders in common, and not an injury 
for which a single stockholder can sue.”  Stuart, 248 P. at 619 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also 12B Fletcher 
Cyc. Corp. § 5913 (“The reasoning behind this rule is said to 
be that a diminution in the value of corporate stock resulting 
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from some depreciation or injury to corporate assets is a 
direct injury only to the corporation; it is merely an indirect or 
incidental injury to an individual shareholder.”).  Nor may 
claims for corporate mismanagement be brought directly.  See 
Weston v. Acme Tool, Inc., 441 P.2d 959, 962 (Okla. 1968) 
(“The remedial rights of minority stockholders with respect to 
wrongs committed against the corporation by the officers and 
directors in the management of corporate affairs are 
derivative rights . . . .”).  Accordingly, to the extent the 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims are masked claims for a 
diminution in value of their limited partner units as a result of 
Kivisto’s mismanagement, their claims are derivative of the 
claims released by the Litigation Trust.  See Lipton v. News 
Int’l, Plc, 514 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1986), disapproved of 
on other grounds by Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 
Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004) (“[W]e must look to the 
nature of the wrongs alleged in the body of the complaint, not 
to the plaintiff’s designation or stated intention.”); Arent v. 
Distribution Scis., Inc., 975 F.2d 1370, 1373 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he fact that plaintiffs framed the harm as a direct fraud 
[does] not permit them to go forward on a claim that [i]s, at 
its core, derivative.”). 
Of course, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs oppose this 
characterization and attribute their injury before SemCrude’s 
bankruptcy in 2008 to the various times when the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs contributed additional capital or retained their 
investments as a result of Kivisto’s inducement.  They argue 
that, at the times they were induced to contribute, the capital 
they received was not worth what they paid.  However, closer 
scrutiny reveals that the gravamen of the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs’ injury is the demise of SemCrude as a result of 
Kivisto’s alleged misconduct.  That is, the course of conduct 
underlying the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ alleged loss—i.e., 
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Kivisto’s failure to disclose his risky trades or self-dealing or 
actively misrepresenting SemCrude’s trading positions—is 
the exact same conduct underlying the alleged cause of 
SemCrude’s bankruptcy and, therefore, the Litigation Trust’s 
released claims against Kivisto.  See App. 326 (asserting in 
their state court petition that Kivisto’s speculative trading 
strategy and self-dealing caused the Oklahoma Plaintiffs to 
“los[e] the full value of their limited partnership units when 
Sem[Crude] declared bankruptcy in July 2008”).  Thus, the 
Bankruptcy Court got it right the first time it passed on the 
issue:  “[T]he injury suffered by the Oklahoma Plaintiffs is no 
different from the injury suffered by SemCrude as a result of 
Kivisto’s wrongful conduct.  Indeed, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ 
alleged loss of capital went hand-in-hand with the titanic 
losses that SemCrude suffered in the run-up to its bankruptcy 
filing.”  App. 19.  The Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ alleged injury 
therefore derives from SemCrude’s injury.  See, e.g., Arent, 
975 F.2d at 1374 (“[Plaintiffs’] claim also fails as a matter of 
law because any injury to plaintiffs was not caused by [the 
corporation’s] failure to disclose.  Plaintiffs were not harmed 
because they were unable to realize the true value of their 
stock—they were harmed because the true value of their stock 
was zero.”); Crocker v. FDIC, 826 F.2d 347, 350-51 (5th Cir. 
1987) (holding that minority shareholders’ claims that they 
“would have” sold their stock had they known that the 
corporation was failing was, at its core, nothing more than a 
derivative claim for diminution in the value of corporate 
stock). 
Accordingly, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs are unable to 
show that they experienced any loss “in addition to” the other 
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equity holders or, equally, the company,7 who were injured 
by Kivisto’s alleged misconduct and experienced the same 
pro rata loss by investing or failing to divest their units.  
“Where all of a corporation’s stockholders are harmed and 
would recover pro rata in proportion with their ownership of 
the corporation’s stock solely because they are stockholders, 
then the claim is derivative in nature.”  Feldman v. Cutaia, 
951 A.2d 727, 733 (Del. 2008); see also Empire Life Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(explaining that claims are derivative where “each 
shareholder suffers relatively in proportion to the number of 
shares he owns”).  Try as they may to distinguish themselves 
from other limited partners, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ losses 
differ only in amount, not in kind.  
And even if the Court found arguendo that the 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs were uniquely harmed, the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs still may not bring claims directly because they 
have no right to recover the losses they assert.  The Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs’ asserted losses are the “millions of dollars [they] 
paid to Sem[Crude] in the form of [additional] capital 
contributions” at Kivisto’s specific request.  App. 350; 
Appellees’ Br. at 21.   However,  any such recovery would be 
considered equity in SemCrude’s estate, which belongs to the 
Litigation Trust.  “[D]estruction or depreciation of the value 
of [a shareholder’s] stock . . . is merely incidental to the 
wrong suffered by the corporation and affects all stockholders 
alike.”  Dobry, 290 P.2d at 137 (internal quotations marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs cannot show 
                                              
7 See Jarvis v. Great Bend Oil Co., 168 P. 450, 454 
(Okla. 1917) (“Where the injury is to the stockholders 
collectively it is said to be an injury to the corporation.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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that they are entitled to receive the benefit of recovery 
without showing an injury to SemCrude.  See Tooley, 845 
A.2d at 1039 (“The stockholder must demonstrate that . . . he 
or she can prevail without showing an injury to the 
corporation.”).8  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Jarvis v. 
Great Bend Oil Co., 168 P. 450 (Okla. 1917), and Johnson v. 
Render, 270 P. 17 (Okla. 1928), which the parties heavily 
dispute, drives this principle home.   In Jarvis, a corporation’s 
promoters induced investors to pay an inflated price for the 
corporation’s stock by fraudulently misrepresenting the price 
                                              
8 Kivisto asserts for the first time on appeal that Tooley 
should not be used to decide the derivative status of claims in 
Oklahoma.  However, it appears that he specifically makes 
this argument with regard to Tooley’s disavowal of the 
“special injury” test used to identify direct claims.  See 
Appellant’s Br. at 22 n.5; see also Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033, 
1035, 1037-39 (disapproving of the “special injury” concept 
and establishing that the analysis must turn solely on “(1) 
who suffered the alleged harm” and “(2) who would receive 
the benefit of any recovery or other remedy”); cf. id. at 1036 
(explaining that the second inquiry “is helpful in analyzing 
the first prong of the analysis: what person or entity has 
suffered the alleged harm?  The second prong of the analysis 
should logically follow.”).  While we may generally look to 
Delaware law in construing Oklahoma corporate law, see 
Beard v. Love, 173 P.3d 796, 802 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) 
(“[I]n the absence of Oklahoma authority we may consult 
decisions from the courts of Delaware and other jurisdictions 
concerning derivative actions.”), we do not rely on the special 
injury test here and therefore do not reach whether Tooley is 
inconsistent with Dobry on this basis. 
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of an oil-and-gas lease, which the corporation thereafter 
purchased.  168 P. at 450-53.  The corporation sued the 
promoters, and the promoters argued that the corporation did 
not have standing because the fraud occurred “prior to the 
organization of the [] corporation.”  Id. at 453.  On appeal, the 
Jarvis Court held that the right of action was properly vested 
in the corporation because the promoters purchased the lease 
using corporate funds previously paid in by the investors 
collectively.  In other words, the investors could not bring 
direct claims; the wrong complained of was fraud against the 
newly-formed corporate entity, which received a lease worth 
less than the amount of corporate funds used to buy it.  As a 
result, all shareholders were affected equally (in proportion to 
their contributions), and “each [shareholder] will be made 
whole if the corporation obtains compensation or restitution 
from the wrongdoer.”  Empire Life Ins. Co., 468 F.2d at 335. 
On the other side of the spectrum is Johnson.  In 
Johnson, the promoters of a corporation induced the plaintiff, 
S.P. Render, to pay an additional “bonus” for the company’s 
stock by misrepresenting the corporation’s value and then 
pocketing the bonus for their own benefit.  270 P. at 17-18.  
The Court rejected appellees’ allegation that the right to sue 
was vested in the corporation.  It explained that, unlike in 
Jarvis, “[i]n the instant case neither the corporation nor the 
stockholders collectively were defrauded of any sum 
whatsoever, [because] the corporation received value, dollar 
for dollar, for its stock,” and because “no breach of duty was 
violated as against the corporation or the stockholders 
collectively.”   Id. at 20.  Rather, 
The fraud complained of was against the 
plaintiff, Render, individually, was a breach of 
duty under the original agreement between him 
and the defendants . . . . The fraud arose from a 
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misrepresentation as to the payment of a bonus 
whereby plaintiff was induced to pay a sum of 
money not in accord with and in violation of 
their original agreement.   
Id.  Accordingly, the Court was “unable to see where the 
corporation in the instant case would have the right to 
maintain any action against the defendants for the recovery 
and return of the sum sought to be recovered by the plaintiff, 
Render.”  Id. 9    
                                              
9 The parties also dispute an unpublished, federal 
district court opinion, Stoner v. Ford, No. 74-311, 1974 WL 
476 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 24, 1974) (applying Oklahoma law), 
which has the least force but which we discuss here for the 
sake of completeness.  In Stoner, the plaintiff brought a suit 
against the promoters and directors of a corporation alleging, 
among other things, that the defendants fraudulently induced 
him to purchase stock in their company by failing to disclose 
that they watered the stock and made a secret profit.  Id. at *4.  
The Stoner Court considered both Jarvis and Dobry and held 
that the fraudulent inducement claim was a direct claim, i.e., a 
“wrong[] affecting Plaintiff as an individual, distinct from any 
harm to the entire body of shareholders.”  Id. at *5.  To the 
extent Stoner bears any force, it speaks to the broader 
principle that inducing a particular individual to purchase 
stock may be a direct injury if the fraud injures neither the 
shareholders collectively nor the corporation.  Like in 
Johnson, in Stoner “the fraud complained of had its inception 
before the corporation was organized.  It was a personal 
transaction between individuals.”  Johnson, 270 P. at 20-21 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Compared to the case at 
bar, where Kivisto’s alleged misconduct induced 
contributions beyond the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ pre-existing 
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Here, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims fall along the 
lines of Jarvis, not Johnson.  SemCrude, not the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs, had the right to pursue an action to recover from 
Kivisto’s fraudulent conduct towards SemCrude and its 
equity holders collectively.  SemCrude, not the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs in their individual capacities, was defrauded by 
Kivisto’s misrepresentations and omissions and injured by his 
alleged misconduct.  Because “the injury or wrong 
complained of was a fraud against the corporation or its 
subscribers collectively,” “the right of action or recovery [i]s 
in the corporation.”  Id.  “Stated differently, the misconduct 
alleged by [the Oklahoma Plaintiffs] did not injure [them] or 
any other [unit]holders directly, but instead only injured them 
indirectly as a result of their ownership of [SemCrude’s 
units].”  See Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 385 
(5th Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ 
claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraud are 
derivative of the claims belonging to—and, importantly, 
released by—the Litigation Trust.  
B. 
The Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ second basis for asserting 
direct injuries is that Kivisto breached fiduciary duties owed 
                                                                                                     
equity interests, “[t]he misrepresentations that allegedly 
caused [their] losses injured not just [the Oklahoma Plaintiffs] 
but the corporation as a whole.”  See Smith v. Waste Mgmt., 
Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Big Lots 
Stores, Inc. v. Bain Capital Fund VII, LLC, 922 A.2d 1169, 
1177 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]he main dividing line between 
direct and derivative claims styled as ‘fraudulent 
inducement,’ [is] whether the plaintiff has alleged some 
injury other than that to the corporation.”).  Thus, Stoner is 
inapposite.  
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to them as individuals.  It is not disputed that Kivisto, as the 
President and CEO of SemCrude, owed fiduciary duties to 
SemCrude, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs, and all other equity 
holders in that role.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Harlow, 860 P.2d 
793, 798 (Okla. 1993).  The question is whether Kivisto owed 
separate and distinct fiduciary duties to the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs, and whether the Oklahoma Plaintiffs were 
individually injured on the basis of the breach of those duties 
such that they are entitled to recover separately from 
SemCrude. 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs argue that a separate fiduciary 
duty was formed based on the parties’ longstanding 
relationship of trust that led the Oklahoma Plaintiffs to rely 
on Kivisto’s superior influence and expertise.  They point to 
Oklahoma law that recognizes the existence of de facto 
fiduciary relationships, in various contexts outside derivative 
suits, where (1) “there is confidence reposed on one side [of a 
relationship] and resulting domination and influence on the 
other,” Lowrance v. Patton, 710 P.2d 108, 111 (Okla. 1985); 
and (2) even when there is no duty to speak, someone 
“volunteers to speak and to convey information which may 
influence the conduct of the other party,” and, as a result, “he 
or she is bound to disclose the whole truth,” Croslin v. 
Enerlex, Inc., 308 P.3d 1041, 1047 (Okla. 2013).  They also 
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rely on an Oklahoma pattern jury charge10 and other authority 
to argue that “whether a separate fiduciary [relationship] 
exist[s] is a question of fact for the jury.”  Appellees’ Br. at 
35-41.   
To be sure, these cases point to a broad interpretation 
of when a fiduciary duty exists under Oklahoma law.  See 
Lowrance, 710 P.2d at 111 (“[C]ourts of equity will not set 
any bounds to the facts and circumstances out of which a 
fiduciary relationship may spring.”).  However, as Kivisto 
emphasizes, Oklahoma courts have never identified a 
violation of a supposed “special duty” to a shareholder in this 
context as loss “in addition to” the loss sustained by the 
corporation under Dobry.  Nor has any other court to our 
knowledge found a direct injury in the context of a derivative 
or direct suit on the basis of a general relationship that forms 
from a power imbalance or out of an obligation to speak the 
truth.  If we found direct claims here, there is no reason why 
the other limited partner unitholders, or any other shareholder 
for that matter, could not bring direct claims.  Indeed, it 
would be difficult to cognizably administer this much broader 
rule the Oklahoma Plaintiffs ask us to endorse.  A reviewing 
court would be forced to determine which communications to 
which equity holders and in what contexts would be 
                                              
10 The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions state that a 
jury can find a fiduciary relationship “based upon the . . . 
[parties’] relationship and the other circumstances in th[e] 
case. A fiduciary relationship exists whenever trust and 
confidence are reasonably placed by one person in the 
integrity and loyalty of another, and the other person 
knowingly accepts that trust and confidence and then 
undertakes to act on behalf of the person.”  Okla. Unif. Jury 
Instr. 26.2.   
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actionable for breach of duty, which appears to undermine the 
principles behind the derivative injury rule.  See Dobry, 290 
P.2d at 137 (explaining “the legal concept of corporate entity 
under which stockholders as such lose their individualities in 
the individuality of the corporation as a separate and distinct 
person”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   Thus, the 
Bankruptcy Court was not wrong in the first instance to 
conclude that the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ allegations for breach 
of fiduciary duty were insufficient.  
Still, even assuming arguendo that Kivisto owed the 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs unique, individual fiduciary duties in 
addition to the duties owed to them in their legal capacity as 
unitholders, the Oklahoma Plaintiffs can show neither that 
they were injured separately from the company or all other 
unitholders on the basis of that misconduct, nor that they were 
entitled to recovery of the units they allegedly would not have 
contributed or would have sold but for Kivisto’s misconduct.  
Thus, for the same reasons we provided above, the Oklahoma 
Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim is derivative.  
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 
Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ claims are derivative of the claims 
rightfully belonging to, and released by, SemCrude’s 
Litigation Trust.  As such, we reverse the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order denying Kivisto’s motion to enjoin and direct it to enter 
a permanent injunction forbidding the Oklahoma Plaintiffs’ 
claims from proceeding in state court. 
